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State v. Barts: North Carolina Relaxes Foundation
Requirements for Mitigating Evidence in
Capital Sentencing Hearings
The hearsay rule excludes from evidence any statement, other than one
made by a declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, which is offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.1 Although the hearsay rule is perhaps
the most frequently encountered evidentiary doctrine in trial practice, 2 its appli-
cation is often complex, owing in large part to the many exceptions to the rule
that have been established over time.3 One such exception is the admission of
hearsay statements which, at the time of their making, could subject the declar-
ant to criminal punishment or civil liability. These "statements against interest"
are admissible under North Carolina law if the declarant is first proved unavaila-
ble to testify, and, in criminal cases, if corroborating evidence clearly indicates
the trustworthiness of the statement.4 If the declarant is available, the propo-
nent must call the declarant to testify and attempt to elicit the earlier statement
in the presence of the jury.
The foundational requirement of declarant unavailability has traditionally
been applied in equally strict fashion in both the guilt and punishment phases of
criminal trials in North Carolina. Recently, however, the North Carolina
Supreme Court relaxed the requirement of declarant unavailability for criminal
defendants in capital sentencing proceedings. In State v. Barts5 the court held
that the exclusion of statements against interest of an available declarant,
although proper under the rules of evidence, 6 violates a defendant's rights to due
process and a fair trial under the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution when the hearsay otherwise bears sufficient indicia of reliability and
trustworthiness. 7
This Note examines the development and purposes of the unavailability re-
quirement for statements against interest, the relationship between the require-
ment and a defendant's rights under the Constitution, and the extent to which
the Barts decision offers guidance for reform. It concludes that the supreme
1. See N.C. R. EvID. 801(c), 802. A "declarant" is the person making the out-of-court state-
ment. N.C. R. EvID. 801(b).
2. M. DOMBROFF, TRIAL HEARSAY: OBJECTIONS & ExcEPTrONS iii (1986).
3. See Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1786, 1786-
87 (1980). The hearsay rule and its exceptions have been said to resemble "an old-fashioned crazy
quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings by cubists, futurists and surrealists." Morgan &
Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REv. 909, 921 (1937).
4. N.C. R. EVID. 804. The North Carolina rule differs from the federal rule in that the North
Carolina rule requires a showing of corroborating circumstances for all statements against interest
used in criminal proceedings, while the federal rule requires corroboration only when the statement
is used by the accused to exculpate herself. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
5. 321 N.C. 170, 362 S.E.2d 235 (1987).
6. Id. at 179, 362 S.E.2d at 240.
7. Id. at 182, 362 S.E.2d at 241. The fourteenth amendment provides that no state may "de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV, § 1.
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court, by ambiguously setting aside the rules of evidence, has sent trial courts
and practitioners a confusing signal that may, without further refinement and
elaboration, increase the dangers inherent in death penalty proceedings.
In November 1983 defendant Earl Barts was recruited by his cousin, Keith
Barts, and John "Fireball" Holmes to participate in the robbery of Richard
Braxton, a seventy-four year-old Alamance County farmer known to carry large
sums of cash on his person.8 On the evening of November 19 Holmes dropped
defendant and Keith Barts from his car near Braxton's farmhouse. The cousins
wore masks and gloves and carried a crowbar and rubber hubcap hammer.9
Finding no one at home, Keith pried open the door of the house. Inside they
stole a .22-caliber pistol.' 0 After searching unsuccessfully for money, they
searched an outside storage shed, where defendant found a baseball bat and
Keith abandoned the crowbar. They returned to the house, where they re-
mained until they saw headlights in the driveway. 1
Braxton drove up and went inside the shed after noticing its open door.' 2
Defendant ran toward Braxton, swinging the baseball bat. Braxton picked up
the discarded crowbar and hit defendant on the arm, causing him to drop the
bat.' 3 Braxton and defendant were struggling when Keith arrived and began to
beat Braxton with the rubber hammer. Once Braxton lay still, defendant took
Braxton's wallet, containing about $3,200, from his bib overalls. Keith struck
Braxton once more with the bat. The cousins then drove Braxton's pickup truck
to meet Holmes and divide up the money. 14
Defendant pleaded guilty to first degree murder, second degree burglary,
felonious larceny, and robbery with a dangerous weapon. 15 Pursuant to the
state's capital sentencing statute,1 6 a jury was impaneled to determine defend-
ant's punishment for the first degree murder charge.' 7 During the sentencing
hearing, defendant sought to introduce the testimony and written statement of
Richard Lockemy, a friend of Keith Barts. Lockemy was prepared to testify as
to a conversation he and Keith had shortly after the robbery:
I didn't see Keith Barts or Fireball until Sunday, November 20, 1983
the day the old man was found dead. That Sunday around lunch time
8. Brief for the State at 5, State v. Barts, 321 N.C. 170, 362 S.E.2d 235 (1987) (No. 370A84).
9. Bars, 321 N.C. at 173, 362 S.E.2d at 236.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 173, 362 S.E.2d at 236-37.
12. Id. at 173, 362 S.E.2d at 237.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 173, 362 S.E.2d at 236-37. Defendant was prosecuted for first degree murder on both
the theories of premeditation and deliberation and felony murder. Id. at 175, 362 S.E.2d at 238. A
person may be convicted of first degree murder under the felony murder theory if the person is
involved in the perpetration of a robbery in which a murder is committed. First degree felony mur-
der is punishable by death. State v. Jones, 290 N.C. 292, 296, 225 S.E.2d 549, 551 (1976). Keith
Barts was also convicted on both the theories of premeditation and deliberation and felony murder.
State v. Barts, 316 N.C. 666, 687, 343 S.E.2d 828, 842 (1986) (appeal of Keith Barts).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983).
17. Barts, 321 N.C. at 173, 362 S.E.2d at 237. Section 15A-2000 of the North Carolina General
Statutes provides for a sentencing recommendation by the jury in any case in which the crime may
be punishable by death. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a) (1983).
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Keith Barts came into the trailer. Keith said, "I did that last night." I
said, "What are you talking about?" Keith said, "I went to the old
man's house and I think I killed him." I said, "God no you didn't kill
him did you?" . . . Keith Barts said that he kept beating the old man
until the old man quit moving. Keith said the old man kept saying,
"Oh God you are going to kill me." Keith said he beat the old man
with something rubber and a crow bar. 18
The State had used the same statement by Lockemy in Keith's trial in order to
prove that Keith alone administered the fatal beating. 19 Defendant contended
introduction of the statement in Barts would show that defendant did not par-
ticipate in the actual killing and could therefore cause the jury to recommend
life imprisonment rather than death.20
Upon objection by the State, the trial judge excluded the testimony as hear-
say. Although Keith's declarations were statements against interest, they were
inadmissible under the hearsay exception for such statements because defendant
had not first proved, as North Carolina law requires, that Keith was unavailable
to testify.21 The trial judge noted that "the defendant ... has the right to sub-
poena any of these [persons] to testify at this hearing. And the Court will give
the defendant clerical assistance and time and opportunity to obtain any of those
[witnesses] to testify at this sentencing hearing."'22 The court excluded all hear-
say portions of Lockemy's testimony, because defendant had made no attempt to
subpoena Keith, who was then incarcerated. 23
After hearing evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors of defend-
ant's participation in the murder, the jury unanimously recommended a sen-
tence of death.24 On June 7, 1984, the trial judge entered judgment of execution
and further sentenced defendant to consecutive sentences of thirty years for sec-
ond degree burglary, three years for felonious larceny, and forty years for rob-
bery with a dangerous weapon.
25
Defendant appealed his death sentence to the North Carolina Supreme
Court,26 contending that the trial court's exclusion of evidence he had offered to
mitigate his participation in the killing deprived him of the right to a fair trial
18. Barfs, 321 N.C. at 178, 362 S.E.2d at 239-40.
19. See State v. Barts, 316 N.C. 666, 675, 343 S.E.2d 828, 835 (1986) (appeal of Keith Barts).
20. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 22, Barfs, 321 N.C. 170, 362 S.E.2d 235 (1987) (No.
370A84).
21. See N.C. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
22. Barfs, 321 N.C. at 179, 362 S.E.2d at 240.
23. Id.
24. Section 15A-2000 requires the jury to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors in determin-
ing punishment. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b)-(f) (1983). Three aggravating circumstances were
submitted for the jury, and all were found to exist. The jury found that defendant had previously
been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, that the murder was
committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of armed robbery, and that the murder
was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Barts, 321 N.C. at 174, 362 S.E.2d at 237. The jury
rejected each of twenty-one mitigating circumstances submitted by defendant. Id.
25. Id.
26. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-979 (1983) (providing for appeal of evidentiary exclusions on
guilty pleas); § 7A-27 (1986) (providing for direct appeal to the supreme court, bypassing the court
of appeals, in cases where a death sentence is imposed).
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under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution.27
The supreme court vacated the death sentence, holding that although the
hearsay statements were properly excluded under state evidentiary rules, the tes-
timony must be admitted in order to guarantee defendant his rights to due pro-
cess and a fair sentencing hearing.28 The court, in an opinion by Justice Martin,
based its decision on Chambers v. Mississippi 2 9 and Green v. Georgia,30 in which
the United States Supreme Court held that exclusion of reliable evidence under
state evidentiary rules may, under certain circumstances, deprive a criminal de-
fendant of the fourteenth amendment right to present evidence critical to his
defense.3 1 The Barts court found that the reliability of the hearsay presented by
defendant mandated its admission:
[Keith Bart's] declarations were decidedly against penal interest and
were made spontaneously to his friend Lockemy shortly after the
crime had occurred. Significantly, the state relied upon Lockemy's tes-
timony at Keith's capital trial to support its theory that Keith alone
had beaten the yictim. Here, moreover, Lockemy was on the witness
stand and subject to cross-examination by the state.32
The court stressed that the evidentiary rules which normally apply during
the guilt phase of trial may be relaxed in the "serious and individualized process
of life or death sentencing."'33 Although it cautioned that the extent to which
evidentiary flexibility is required in capital sentencing is best resolved on a case-
by-case basis, 34 the court was clear that "[u]nder the facts of this case our hear-
say rules must yield to due process considerations. 3 5
Justice Meyer, in a dissenting opinion, objected to the breadth of the major-
ity holding.36 He drew a distinction between the oral testimony of defense wit-
ness Lockemy and Lockemy's written statement. After Lockemy took the
witness stand, defense counsel was prepared to have Lockemy read from the
statement, which Lockemy had earlier given to the State Bureau of Investiga-
tion. The majority based its ruling on the contents of the written statement37
27. Barts, 321 N.C. at 179-80, 362 S.E.2d at 240.
28. Because defendant's sentencing hearing concluded on June 7, 1984, and the codified North
Carolina Rules of Evidence did not become effective until July 1, 1984, Barts was decided under the
common-law principles for statements against interest. At the time of Barts, however, the common-
law rule in North Carolina was nearly identical to the federal and codified North Carolina rules. See
infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
29. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
30. 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam).
31. See Green, 442 U.S. at 96-97; Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. For a discussion of Green and
Chambers, see infra notes 77-97 and accompanying text.
32. Barts, 321 N.C. at 181, 362 S.E.2d at 241 (citation omitted).
33. Id. at 180, 362 S.E.2d at 240 (citing State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 19 n.9, 292 S.E.2d 203, 219
n.9, cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982)).
34. Id. (citing State v. Williams, 295 N.C. 655, 249 S.E.2d 709 (1978)).
35. Id. at 182, 362 S.E.2d at 241. In April 1988 defendant was resentenced after Lockemy's
hearsay testimony was admitted. The jury recommended a life sentence. Telephone interview with
Robert E. Collins, Attorney-at-Law, Alamance County, North Carolina (May 7, 1988).
36. Barts, 321 N.C. at 184-85, 362 S.E.2d at 243 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
37. Because defense counsel initially failed to make an offer of proof as to the contents of Lock-
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and did not restrict its decision to either oral or written hearsay. To Justice
Meyer this was unacceptable because on remand the written statement could be
admitted without Lockemy's presence in the courtroom. 38 He was concerned
that "the majority opinion gives no assurance that Lockemy's written statement
containing the hearsay can be introduced by way of Lockemy's testimony only if
Lockemy is subject to cross-examination, or otherwise condition its introduction
upon the availability of Lockemy for cross-examination concerning the state-
ment .... ,,39 If the decision were restricted to oral testimony, Justice Meyer
would have joined the majority in departing from the rigid application that in
the past has been afforded the rules of evidence in jury sentencing proceedings. 40
The testimony of live witnesses, speaking from personal knowledge and
subject to cross-examination, has traditionally been considered the form of evi-
dence most likely to lead to discovery of the truth.41 As early as 1690, hearsay
testimony was excluded from trials on the ground that such evidence was intrin-
sically unreliable. 42 Yet almost as early as courts excluded hearsay, they devel-
oped exceptions to the rule. Experienced attorneys and judges found that
certain categories of extrajudicial statements possessed a "circumstantial
probability of trustworthiness," 43 and eventually such hearsay as business
records, records of vital statistics, dying declarations, and excited utterances
were admitted into evidence. 44 Such exceptions endured in the law, largely on
the premise that one of the principal benefits of live testimony-the ability to
cross-examine the declarant-was either unnecessary or impossible.45
Unlike other categories of reliable hearsay, however, the out-of-court con-
fession to a crime endured a difficult passage to acceptance as a hearsay excep-
tion. Shortly after the general hearsay exclusion was established, courts
admitted statements against the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest. 46
The exception was eventually extended to include any statement that was trust-
emy's oral testimony in order to preserve the issue for appeal, the supreme court had no record on
which to review the trial court's exclusion of the evidence. Barts, 321 N.C. at 178, 362 S.E.2d at 239.
In its discretion, however, the court allowed defendant to amend the record to include Lockemy's
written statement for the purposes of appellate review. Id. (applying N.C. R. ApP. P. 9(b)(5)).
38. Justice Meyer believed the majority's reliance on Chambers and Green was misplaced, be-
cause both cases involved hearsay testimony from live witnesses who could be properly cross-ex-
amined. Bars, 321 N.C. at 184-85, 362 S.E.2d at 243 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 186, 362 S.E.2d at 244 (Meyer, J., dissenting). For an analysis of the concerns ex-
pressed in the dissent, see infra note 142.
40. Id. at 185-86, 362 S.E.2d at 244 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
41. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 10, at 23 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
MCCORMICK].
42. See 5 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1364, at 18 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974) [here-
inafter WIGMORE].
43. Id. § 1422, at 253.
44. See generally McCoRMIcK, supra note 41, §§ 245-53 (outlining history and substance of
various exceptions to the hearsay rule). For an example of a modem codification of these and other
exceptions, see FED. R. EvID. 801-804.
45. WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 1420, at 251-53.
46. WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 1476, at 349-50. "Proprietary" in this sense refers to "[t]hose
rights which an owner of property has by virtue of his ownership." BLACK'S LAW DICToNARY
1098 (5th ed. 1979) (citing Asch v. First Nat'l Bank in Dallas, 304 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Tex. Civ. Ct.
App. 1957)). The clearest example of a declaration against pecuniary interest is an admission that
the declarant is indebted. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 277, at 821 (citing German Ins. Co. v.
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worthy by virtue of its incriminatory impact on the declarant. By about 1830,
courts in England were freely admitting statements against penal interest.4 7 In
1844, however, the House of Lords arbitrarily reversed this trend. In the Sussex
Peerage Case 48 the rule was announced, with little explanation, that all hearsay
statements subjecting the declarant to criminal liability were to be excluded from
evidence.49 American courts, apparently due to fear of opening the door to a
flood of perjured testimony, 50 followed the anomalous result of Sussex Peerage
well into the twentieth century.51
In 1913 Justice Holmes issued one of the earliest and most influential at-
tacks on the exclusion of statements against penal interest. Dissenting in Don-
nelly v. United States,5 2 he observed that "no other statement is so much against
interest as a confession of murder."'5 3 The foremost commentators, following
Holmes, condemned continuation of the exclusion,54 but the refusal to recognize
statements against penal interest as a valid exception persisted.5 A few state
courts, however, began to avoid this rule by construing the crime implicated in
the statement in its civil context-as a tort-rendering the statement one against
the declarant's pecuniary interest. 56 Statements against penal interest gained
Bartlett, 188 I1. 165, 58 N.E. 1075 (1900); Truelsch v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 186 Wis.
239, 202 N.W. 352 (1925)).
47. WIGMOPE, supra note 41, § 1476, at 350.
48. 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1844).
49. In Sussex Peerage the court refused to admit a deceased clergyman's declaration that he
had performed a marriage which would have subjected him to prosecution under the Royal Mar-
riage Act. The House of Lords affirmed the admissibility of statements against pecuniary interest,
but rejected the penal interest exception in a conclusory fashion. Lord Brougham declared simply
that "[t]o say, if a man should confess a felony for which he would be liable to prosecution, that
therefore, the instant the grave closes over him, all that was said by him is to be taken as evidence in
every action and prosecution against another person, is one of the most monstrous and untenable
propositions that can be advanced." Id. at 1045. Lord Denman offered the lack of cross-examina-
tion as a reason for disallowing the penal interest exception. Id. He did not justify why confessions
to crimes should be treated differently than statements against pecuniary or proprietary interest,
which are admitted without an opportunity for cross-examination.
50. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 278, at 823. According to Wigmore, the argument that state-
ments against penal interest must be excluded in order to prevent the introduction of fabricated
testimony is but an example of "the ancient rusty weapon that has always been brandished to oppose
any reform in the rules of evidence." WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 1477, at 358-59.
51. See eg., Munshower v. State, 55 Md. 11 (1880); Neighbours v. State, 121 Ohio St. 525, 169
N.E. 839 (1930); Commonwealth v. Antonini, 165 Pa. Super. 501, 69 A.2d 436 (1949).
52. 228 U.S. 243, 277 (1913) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 278 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
54. See MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 278, at 823; WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 1477, at 360
(referring to the Donnelly holding as a "barbarous doctrine"); I F. WHARTON, EVIDENCE IN CRIMI-
NAL CASES § 438, at 689-90 n.12 (11th ed. 1935) (continuation of exclusion "opposed to all logic");
Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1, 39-
43 (1944).
55. See, eg., Neal v. United States, 22 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1927); Moya v. People, 79 Colo. 104,
244 P. 69 (1926); State v. Stallings, 154 Conn. 272, 224 A.2d 718 (1966); Bryant v. State, 197 Ga.
641, 30 S.E.2d 259 (1944); Rushing v. State, 88 Okla. Crim. 82, 199 P.2d 614 (1948); Common-
wealth v. Antonini, 165 Pa. Super. 501, 69 A.2d 436 (1949).
56. See e.g., Weber v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.W. 852 (1915) (confes-
sion that declarant unbolted a train, causing a derailment); Letendre v. Hartford Accident & In-
demn. Co., 21 N.Y.2d 518, 236 N.E.2d 467, 289 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1968) (employee's incriminating
statements to surety's agent admissible in fidelity bond action); Kittredge v. Grannis, 244 N.Y. 168,
155 N.E. 88 (1926) (declaration of forgery); Gray v. State Capital Life Ins. Co., 254 N.C. 286, 118
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limited recognition in their own right by the middle of this century,57 and the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which adopted the exception 5 8 provided added im-
petus for reform by the states.59
Early courts, wary of perjury, restrained the admission of "less-reliable"
hearsay to those situations in which admission was absolutely necessary: when
the declarant's testimony could not otherwise be obtained. 6° Consequently ad-
mission of statements against interest has always been conditioned upon some
form of declarant unavailability. 61 Until the late nineteenth century, death was
the only recognized ground for admitting the extrajudicial testimony. 62 The def-
inition of unavailability was eventually extended to include insanity, physical
illness, refusal to testify, and lack of memory. 63 The Federal Rules, borrowing
from existing state rules, further extended the definition and allowed admission
of statements against interest when the declarant is absent from the proceeding
and is beyond the reach of process or when the declarant invokes a privilege
from testifying."
North Carolina wholly excluded statements against penal interest through-
S.E.2d 909 (1961) (insured's statement that he was shot while attempting a break-in admissible to
show death not by accident under policy).
57. See eg., People v. Lettrich, 413 Ill. 172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952); Brady v. State, 226 Md.
422, 174 A.2d 167 (1961), aff'd, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Newberry v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 445, 61
S.E.2d 318 (1950).
58. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
59. For an analysis of state legislative adoption of the statement-against-penal-interest excep-
tion, see 4 J. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE I 804(b)(3)[04] (1987 & Supp. May 1988); see
also Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest: Standards of Admissibility Under an Emerging Ma-
jority Rule, 56 B.U.L. Rxv. 148, 149 (1976) (detailing judicial adoption of the exception).
60. WIGMORE, supra note 42, §§ 1420-21, at 252-54.
61. WIGMORE, supra note 42, §§ 1455-56, at 323-28.
62. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 253, at 755.
63. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 253, at 754-757.
64. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1), (5). For a discussion of the state enactments on which the
federal rule is based, see FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee's note. Although courts have stead-
fastly adhered to the unavailability requirement, commentators have questioned its merits. See, eg.,
2 E. MOROAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 294 (1961); Comment, Evidence: The Unavailability
Requirement of Declaration Against Interest Hearsay, 55 IowA L. REv. 477, 481-82 (1969). Because
of the requirement of corroboration for the statement-against-interest exception in a criminal case,
one commentator has maintained that the unavailability requirement actually increases the dangers
that a jury will receive untrustworthy testimony:
It is arguable that the effectiveness of cross-examination is greatly diminished when it is
not conducted immediately, and that a false or inaccurate out-of-court] statement is more
difficult to discredit when the declarant has had an opportunity to consider its implications
prior to being interrogated. But where the out-of-court statement was-made under circum-
stances which render it unusually trustworthy, as is the case with declarations against in-
terest, the likelihood is that the subsequent testimony, rather than the utterance involved,
will be false or inaccurate. The introduction of the declaration would therefore facilitate
rather than impede the disclosure of truth.
Note, Declarations Against Interesv A Critical Review of the Unavailability Requirement, 52 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 301, 309 (1967) (emphasis added; citation omitted).
Arguments against the unavailability requirement have, however, met with only limited success.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence, promulgated in 1942, dispensed with the unavailability require-
ment. See UNIF. R. EVID. 63(10). This codification did not gain widespread recognition. Today
Kansas and New Jersey, which adopted the Uniform Rules, are the only states not requiring declar-
ant unavailability for statements against interest. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4600) (Supp. 1987);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84-63(10) (West 1976); see also V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5 § 932(10) (1967)
(adopting uniform rule).
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out most of its history. As early as 1833, eleven years before the English courts
excluded such statements in Sussex Peerage,65 the North Carolina Supreme
Court excluded the out-of-court confessions of a third party.6 6 Although the
courts seldom provided analysis for the policy,67 the last case to exclude state-
ments against penal interest, State v. Madden,68 gave the supreme court some
justification for continuing the exclusion. In Madden an incarcerated third
party confessed to the crimes for which two defendants were on trial. A week
later he recanted the confession, telling police that defendants were indeed
guilty. Later investigation revealed that neither of his declarations was sup-
ported by fact. 69
In 1978 the supreme court nevertheless reversed North Carolina's 150-
year-old hostility to statements against penal interest. In State v. Haywood 70 the
supreme court announced that it would admit such statements but required as
foundation a showing that the declarant is unavailable to testify and that the
evidence is sufficiently trustworthy.7 1 As in the Federal Rules, unavailability
was defined to include death, mental or physical illness, inability to be subpoe-
naed, and exemption on the ground of self-incrimination. The court further
required that any hearsay statement exculpating a criminal defendant
be sufficiently corroborated in order to "indicate the probability of
trustworthiness."'72
65. 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1844). See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
66. State v. May, 15 N.C. (I Dev.) 328 (1833). Defendant Daniel May was charged with larceny
of a slave. At trial defendant offered the confession of one William May to show that William alone
had stolen the slave. William had fled the state soon after the crime. Justice Gaston wrote,
The criminal act imputed to the prisoner might as readily be committed by many as by one.
The question of William May's guilt or innocence was not necessarily connected with that
of the guilt or innocence of Daniel. Both might be guilty, or both might be innocent, and a
common guilt or common innocence was as presumable as the guilt of one only.... The
thing to be proved must not only be relevant, but the testimony offered must be such as the
law sanctions.
Id. at 338-39.
67. See, eg., State v. English, 201 N.C. 295, 299-300, 159 S.E. 318, 320 (1931) (decision based
only on the "numerical weight of authority" and "an increasing line of legal descendants in this
State").
68. 292 N.C. 114, 232 S.E.2d 656 (1977).
69. See id. at 130, 232 S.E.2d at 666; see also State v. Haywood, 295 N.C. 709, 723, 249 S.E.2d
429, 438 (1978) ("The facts in Madden demonstrate the reasonableness of the courts' fear that the
unrestricted admission of such confessions as a declaration against interest would open a spillway to
a flood of peijured testimony.").
70. 295 N.C. 709, 249 S.E.2d 429 (1978).
71. Id. at 730, 249 S.E.2d at 442. Chief Justice Sharp outlined three reasons for changing the
common-law exclusion:
The arguments in favor of admitting declarations against penal interest are (1) that a per-
son's desire to avoid criminal liability is as strong as his desire to protect his economic
interests and his declarations against penal interest are as trustworthy as those concerning
his pocketbook, for "no other statement is so much against interest as a confession of
murder"; (2) that since a conviction of crime ordinarily results in an economic loss, the
traditional concept of a pecuniary interest could logically include one's penal interest; and
(3) that it is a "barbarous doctrine" which would permit manifest injustice by not allowing
an innocent accused to vindicate himself by introducing evidence of a third person's confes-
sion that he was the true culprit.
Id. at 724, 249 S.E.2d at 438 (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 730, 249 S.E.2d at 442. The statement-against-interest exception, and indeed the
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The relationship between the hearsay rule and its exceptions and a criminal
defendant's rights under the fourteenth amendment 73 has never been fully devel-
oped by either the United States Supreme Court or commentators on constitu-
tional and evidentiary issues.74 The principle of procedural due process, which
the court deemed violated in Barts, is "perhaps the least frozen concept in our
law-the least confined to history and the most absorptive of powerful social
standards of a progressive society."'7 5 Definitions of this fluid concept are natu-
rally varied, but perhaps the most succinct description of due process came from
Justice Cardozo, who described the principle as the right to those privileges and
immunities "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental."' 76 This principle-the right to a "fair trial"-and its
relationship to the accused's right to present evidence to exculpate herself was
first addressed by the United States Supreme Court in the 1973 case of Cham-
bers v. Mississippi.77
In Chambers defendant was charged with murder, but shortly after his
arrest, another man, Gable McDonald, confessed to the crime in statements to
police and friends. A month later McDonald repudiated his confessions.78 At
trial Chambers sought to introduce evidence of McDonald's statement to police.
Because the State did not put McDonald on the stand, Chambers was forced to
call him as a defense witness. Chambers' attorney introduced McDonald's state-
ment, but on cross-examination McDonald repudiated the confession. Because
the Mississippi "voucher rule" 79 prevented Chambers from impeaching his own
entire body of evidentiary rules, has generally been applied with equal force at all proceedings where
a jury is present. See, eg., State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 19 n.9, 292 S.E.2d 203, 219 n.9 (defendant's
right to present mitigating evidence heavily circumscribed on relevance grounds while court never-
theless stresses the need for "flexibility" in the "serious and individualized process of life or death
sentencing"), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982). This is somewhat surprising, considering the texts
of various North Carolina statutes. The codified North Carolina Rules of Evidence, enacted in 1983,
purport to exempt sentencing proceedings from their coverage. N.C. R. EVID. l101(b)(3). Also, the
statute that governs capital sentencing hearings states that "[e]vidence may be presented as to any
matter the court deems relevant to sentence .. . or to have probative value." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-2000(a)(3) (1983). Although these provisions appear to exempt sentencing proceedings from
the Rules of Evidence, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257
S.E.2d 551 (1979), cerL denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980), analyzed Section 15A-2000(a)(3) and deter-
mined that "tt]he language of this statute does not alter the usual rules of evidence or impair the trial
judge's power to rule on the admissibility of evidence." Id. at 98, 257 S.E.2d at 559.
73. For the text of the fourteenth amendment, see supra note 7.
74. "IT]he relative lack of attention devoted to exclusionary rules of evidence and their impact
on the accused's right to present an adequate defense is almost inexplicable." Churchwell, The
Constitutional Right to Present Evidence: Progeny of Chambers v. Mississippi, 19 CRIM. L. BuLL.
131, 131 (1983) (citations omitted).
75. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
76. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
77. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
78. Id. at 286-88.
79. "A party to a suit desiring to examine any opposite party in open court, may, without first
taking his deposition, have such party subpoenaed as a witness and examine him in the presence of
the court. ... Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-53 (1972). Because the trial court did not consider
McDonald an "opposite party," Chambers was not allowed to cross-examine or impeach him.
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 291. Cf N.C. R. EVID. 607 ("The credibility of a witness may be attacked by
any party, including the party calling him." The North Carolina rule is nearly identical to Federal
Rule of Evidence 607.).
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witness, he could not attack McDonald's denial.80 Chambers next sought to
introduce the testimony of the three other persons to whom McDonald had con-
fessed, but the trial court excluded the evidence as hearsay.8 '
The Supreme Court reversed Chambers' conviction, holding that the refusal
to allow Chambers to impeach McDonald, combined with the exclusion of relia-
ble evidence, albeit hearsay, denied Chambers a fair trial. The Court criticized
the state's refusal to recognize the statement-against-penal-interest exception 82
and attacked the state voucher rule as a "remnant of primitive English trial
practice."18 3 The Court was quick to note, however, that it was not considering
whether the application of either rule-the voucher rule or the exclusion of
statements against penal interest-by itself could violate the fourteenth amend-
ment, but only that the combination of the two restrictions denied Chambers "a
trial in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due process." 84
Following its invalidation of the absolute limitations imposed by the Missis-
sippi evidence code in Chambers, the Supreme Court, in 1978, invalidated an-
other absolute limitation: a death penalty statute that strictly proscribed the
types of mitigating evidence a defendant could offer. In Lockett v. Ohio85 the
Court held that an Ohio statute allowing a jury to consider only a finite list of
mitigating factors in capital sentencing violated the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. 86 Chief Justice Burger, in a plurality opinion, wrote that "the sen-
80. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 291.
81. Id. at 292-93.
82. The Court observed the following:
Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own
defense. In the exercise of this right the accused, as is required of the State, must comply
with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and relia-
bility in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence. Although perhaps no rule of evidence
has been more respected or more frequently applied in jury trials than that applicable to
the exclusion of hearsay, exceptions tailored to allow the introduction of evidence which in
fact is likely to be trustworthy have long existed. The testimony rejected by the trial court
here bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and thus was well within the basic ra-
tionale of the exception for declarations against interest. That testimony also was critical
to Chambers' defense. In these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly affect-
ing the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mecha-
nistically to defeat the ends ofjustice.
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 (citation omitted).
83. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 296. The Court rejected the State's view that McDonald's testimony
was not "adverse" to Chambers, because "McDonald's retraction inculpated Chambers to the same
extent that it exculpated McDonald." Id. at 297-98. The Court further declared that a rule prohib-
iting a criminal defendant from impeaching that defendant's own witness was illogical, since defend-
ants rarely are able to pick their own witnesses. Id. at 296.
84. Id. The Court limited its holding as follows:
In reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor does
our holding signal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded to the states in the
establishment and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and procedures.
Rather, we hold quite simply that under the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings
of the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial.
Id. at 302-3. Compare Owens v. Estelle, 484 F. Supp. 230, 231 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (Chambers limited
to cases where combination of hearsay and voucher rules exclude evidence), aff'd mem., 611 F.2d
880 (5th Cir. 1980) with Lipinski v. New York, 557 F.2d 289, 292 (2d Cir. 1977) (approving exten-
sion of Chambers beyond voucher rule cases), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1074 (1978).
85. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
86. Id. at 604 (plurality opinion).
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tencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, [should] not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or rec-
ord and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death."8 7
Although some commentators have argued that this language in Lockett
should allow a defendant to put forth mitigating factors without regard to the
rules of evidence,88 the Court seemed to indicate that it was concerned with the
"range of factors" presented, rather than the form in which the evidence was
admitted.89 Such an interpretation was adopted by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in State v. Pinch.90 The Pinch court, evaluating the constitutionality of
the state capital sentencing statute, cited Lockett and held that the "ultimate
issue concerning the admissibility of ... evidence must still be decided by the
presiding judge, and his decision is guided by the usual rules which exclude
repetitive or unreliable evidence or that lacking an adequate foundation." 91
The Chambers and Lockett decisions may have been broadened by the
Supreme Court in Green v. Georgia.92 In Green the defendant and Carzell
Moore were indicted for rape and murder. Moore was tried separately and con-
victed of both charges. Green was convicted of murder and, in a separate trial,
was sentenced to death.93 At his sentencing hearing Green attempted to intro-
duce the testimony of Thomas Pasby, who had testified for the State at Moore's
trial. According to Pasby, Moore had admitted to committing the murder by
himself.94 Because Georgia did not recognize any exception to the hearsay rule
for statements against penal interest,95 the trial court excluded Pasby's testi-
mony.9 6 Although its opinion offered no constitutional analysis, the Supreme
Court reversed the conviction on the ground that the exclusion of Pasby's testi-
mony denied Green a fair trial:
Regardless of whether the proffered testimony comes within Georgia's
hearsay rule, under the facts of this case its exclusion constituted a
87. Id. (citations omitted).
88. E.g., Hertz and Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Deathk Lockett v. Ohio and the
Capital Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 317,
365-66 (1981).
89. See Lockett, 348 U.S. at 602 ("[IThe concept of individualized sentencing ... has long been
accepted in this country. Consistent with that concept, sentencing judges traditionally have taken a
wide range of factors into account." (citation omitted)). For an observation of other concerns that
must be addressed in death penalty sentencing, see infra note 130.
90. 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982). Pinch was relied on by the
Barts court for the proposition that "[e]videntiary flexibility is encouraged in the serious and individ-
ualized process of life and death sentencing." Barts, 321 N.C. at 180, 362 S.E.2d at 240. The Pinch
court, however, found no reversible error in the trial court's exclusion of mitigating evidence offered
by the defendant. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 19, 292 S.E.2d at 219.
91. Pinch, 366 N.C. at 19, 292 S.E.2d at 219 (citation omitted).
92. 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam).
93. See Green v. State, 115 Ga. App. 685, 155 S.E.2d 655 (1967), aff'd, 242 Ga. 261, 249
S.E.2d 1 (1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 95 (1979).
94. Green, 442 U.S. at 96.
95. Georgia recognized the traditional exception for declarations against pecuniary interest.
See Little v. Stynchcombe, 227 Ga. 311, 180 S.E.2d 541 (1971).
96. This ruling was upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court. Green v. State, 242 Ga. 261, 249
S.E.2d 1 (1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 95 (1979).
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violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The excluded testimony was highly relevant to a critical issue in the
punishment phase of the trial, and substantial reasons existed to as-
sume its reliability. Moore made his statement spontaneously to a
close friend. The evidence corroborating the confession was ample,
and indeed sufficient to procure a conviction of Moore and a capital
sentence. The statement was against interest, and there was no reason
to believe that Moore had any ulterior motive in making it. Perhaps
most important, the State considered the testimony sufficiently reliable
to use it against Moore, and to base a sentence of death upon it.97
What was "most important" to the Green Court was the State's contradic-
tion of itself, through two separate prosecutions, at the expense of a criminal
defendant. 9 8 The same contradiction was at work in Barts. In its earlier prose-
cution of Keith Barts, the State used Richard Lockemy's statement of Keith's
confession to prove that Keith alone had beaten the victim.99 Later, in alleging
that Earl Barts committed the murder, the State sought to exclude the very
statement on which it had earlier relied. 100 Although the Barts court considered
this inconsistency "significant," 10 1 it chose to set aside a standard application of
the rules of evidence in order to guarantee defendant a fair trial, rather than to
seize upon this substantially more limited, and perhaps more lucid, basis for its
result.
Barts is nevertheless significant because it is the first case in which the
North Carolina Supreme Court has mandated relaxation of a provision of the
rules of evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding. An analysis of the authori-
ties and principles on which Barts rests, however, suggests that the constitu-
tional basis for this relaxation is far from clear and that success under Barts in
preserving the right to a fair trial is far from guaranteed. The Barts court appar-
ently believed the requirement that available hearsay declarants be brought forth
in order for the jury to receive their confessions imposed procedures so rigid as
to deny defendant a fair hearing. Yet the court's conclusory disposition of the
case, which offers no guidance for courts and practitioners, itself imposes the
due process risk of unpredictable and arbitrary interpretation. Rather than base
97. Green, 442 U.S. at 97 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)) (footnote omitted;
emphasis added). Justice Rehnquist issued a caustic dissent in Green, viewing the decision as "an-
other step toward embalming the law of evidence in the Due Process Clause .. " Id. at 98 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist took "comfort only from the fact that since this is a capital case, it is
perhaps an example of the maxim that 'hard cases make bad law.'" Id. In Justice Rehnquist's view,
all the fourteenth amendment requires regarding the rules of evidence is that a state's evidentiary
code be "evenhandedly" applied. Id. That certain evidence might be introduced by one party and
not another was simply a "fact of trial life, embodied throughout the hearsay rule and its excep-
tions." Id. at 99. Rehnquist believed that "the United States Constitution must be strained to or
beyond the breaking point to conclude that all capital defendants who are unable to introduce all of
the evidence which they seek to admit are denied a fair trial." Id.
98. Id. at 97.
99. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
100. Barfs, 321 N.C. at 178, 362 S.E.2d at 239. The State's contradictory actions no doubt
resulted from its prosecution of Barts for first degree murder both on the theory of premeditation
and deliberation and on the theory of felony murder, with little evidence to support the premedita-
tion and deliberation charge. See supra note 15.
101. See id. at 181, 362 S.E.2d at 241.
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its decision on an ambiguous-and questionable-constitutional foundation, the
court might better have served the principle of fair sentencing by disposing of
the case on narrower procedural grounds.
Defendant in Barts faced a difficult, aind undoubtedly common, tactical
problem. In order to put Keith's out-of-court statement before the jury, the
defense either had to prove Keith unavailable (which it could not do) or sub-
poena him from the state prison. Once Keith was on the stand, one of three
scenarios would have developed. First, Keith could have repeated the statement
he made to Lockemy, but the incriminating effect of the testimony would make
such action unlikely. Second, Keith could have refused to testify under the priv-
ilege of the fifth amendment.' 0 2 This would have rendered him unavailable, 10 3
and Lockemy's statement could have then been admitted without violating the
rules of evidence. Third, and perhaps most likely, Keith could simply deny ever
having made the confession. Defendant could then have impeached him with
his prior inconsistent statement by putting Lockemy on the stand.1 4 As mere
impeachment evidence, however, Keith's earlier confession could not be used by
the jury for its truth, but only to evaluate Keith's veracity on the stand. The
effect desired by defendant might nevertheless be accomplished, for the "either-
or" nature of Keith's conflicting statements could raise sufficient doubt of de-
fendant's participation in the beating. Putting Keith on the stand, however,
would raise a greater risk for defendant: the State, on cross-examination, might
well elicit testimony that would convince the jury that defendant's involvement
in the murder was greater than the State's earlier evidence suggested.
Some commentators have argued that the proper solution in such a situa-
tion is to admit the hearsay without regard to the unavailability requirement and
to place the burden of bringing the declarant forward on the opposing party. 10 5
102. The fifth amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
103. See N.C. R. EVID. 804(a)(1).
104. See N.C. R. EvID. 613. The North Carolina rule differs from the federal rule in that North
Carolina did not adopt the foundation requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b). Founda-
tion requirements for admitting extrinsic evidence of the witness' prior inconsistent statement con-
tinue in North Carolina to be governed by case law. See H. BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 48 (2d rev. ed. 1982 & Supp. 1986).
105. Note, supra note 64, at 309. Reform of the statement-against-interest exception, requiring
substantive admissibility of the evidence when the declarant is available and brought forward or
when the declarant is proved unavailable, is a logical alternative the Barts court might have consid-
ered. One approach, which has been adopted in California, is to retain the unavailability require-
ment while admitting, as substantive evidence, the prior inconsistent statement of the witness. See
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1230 (West 1966). This would force the proponent of the exculpatory state-
ment-defendant in Barts-to place the declarant before the jury.
Although the burden is on the defendant to prove the existence of mitigating factors, see Patter-
son v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), the spirit of traditional criminal jurisprudence suggests that a
defendant be relieved, whenever possible, of potentially offering the State additional incriminating
evidence. This implies, at least in criminal trials-and especially in capital cases-that the unavaila-
bility requirement should be dropped. Upon admission of the otherwise reliable hearsay, the State
would bear the burden of finding the declarant in order to refute the exculpatory evidence. In many
situations, however, the declarant may be unidentified, or her whereabouts may be known only to
the defendant. As one commentator has noted, "Since the proponent of the evidence, although
knowing of the declarant's whereabouts and of his availability to testify, would nevertheless be able
to deprive the trier of fact of valuable first-hand information by relying solely on the hearsay evi-
dence, it would probably be more prudent to rest the burden on the proponent [through the unavail-
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The opposing party in Barts-the State-might, however, have its own strategic
reluctance to bring forward as a witness a person against whom it had secured a
sentence of life in prison. Under the supreme court's decision in Barts, if either
the State or defendant fears the pottntial impact of the hearsay declarant's testi-
mony, the jury must decide a question of life or death sentencing without receiv-
ing critical evidence in the form traditionally deemed most likely to ensure
justice-from the first-hand testimony of an available, live witness. 10 6
Regarding the necessity of bringing forth an available declarant, the Cham-
bers opinion, on which the Barts majority relied, offers ambiguous signals.
These signals could be used to dispute the Barts result as much as to support it.
Unlike Barts, Chambers involved a state rule of evidence that excluded state-
ments against penal interest in all circumstances. Chambers differs from Barts
more significantly, however, in that the hearsay declarant in Chambers was sub-
poenaed by defendant and was available-in the courtroom-to testify. 10 7 The
Supreme Court acknowledged the presence of the declarant as crucial to its deci-
sion. that due process was violated:
[]f there was any question about the truthfulness of the extrajudicial
statements, McDonald was present in the courtroom and had been
under oath. He could have been cross-examined by the State, and his
demeanor and responses weighed by the jury. The availability of Mc-
Donald significantly distinguishes this case from the prior Mississippi
precedent, Brown v. State, and from the Donnelly-type situation, since
in both cases the declarant was unavailable at the time of trial.10 8
State courts have provided surprisingly contrasting interpretations of this
statement in Chambers. Because the declarant in Chambers was present to tes-
ability requirement]." Note, supra note 64, at 309. The rules of evidence, however, through the
requirement that statements against interest be substantially corroborated, would seem largely to
eliminate the risk that the whereabouts of a declarant might be kept secret. See N.C. R. EVID.
804(b)(3).
This reform of the statement-against-interest requirement would have the additional benefit of
offering a defendant a consistent right to present evidence at both the guilt and sentencing phases of
trial. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
107. Chambers requested the court to order McDonald to appear by filing a pretrial motion,
which was granted by the trial court. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 291. McDonald, who earlier had been
jailed based on his murder confession, was released from custody after he repudiated his involvement
in the crime. Id. at 287-88.
108. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 301 (citing Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913); Brown v.
State, 99 Miss. 719, 55 So. 961 (1911)). In response to a hypothetical posed by the State, the Court
acknowledged that introduction of the confession of an unavailable declarant could itself lead to
injustice. The State posited the following:
If the rule were changed, A could be charged with the crime; B could tell C and D that he
committed the crime; B could go into hiding and at A's trial C and D would testify as to
B's admission of guilt; A could be acquitted and B would return to stand trial; B could then
provide several witnesses to testify as to his whereabouts at the time of the crime. The
testimony of those witnesses along with A's statement that he really committed the crime
could result in B's acquittal. A would be barred from further prosecution because of the
protection against double jeopardy. No one could be convicted of perjury as A did not
testify at his first trial, B did not lie under oath, and C and D were truthful in their
testimony.
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 301-02 n.21. The Court responded that "[o]bviously, B's absence at trial is
critical to the success of the justice-subverting ploy." Id.
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tify, the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that statements against penal inter-
est are admissible only when the declarant is available. I0 9 The Connecticut
Supreme Court has declared that Chambers "does nothing to alter the common
law condition precedent of the declarant's unavailability to the admissibility of
third party declarations against penal interest."' 1 0 Significantly, in State v. Hay-
wood,111 cited in Barts as the basis for the correct application of the unavailabil-
ity requirement by the trial court, the North Carolina Supreme Court noted that
the "'minimal evidentiary criteria'" mandated by the "'Chambers rule'" in-
cluded the requirement that "'the declarant's testimony is otherwise unavaila-
ble.' "112 Although state courts have disagreed on the effect of Chambers on the
statement-against-interest exception, perhaps the most thoughtful interpretation
of the decision, consistent with the guarantee of a fair trial, was announced by
the federal judge who wrote, "[A]s I perceive the due process principle an-
nounced in Chambers, it commands that every material source of evidence as to
what was said and done by the principal players... should be laid before the
triers of fact."" 3
The brief per curiam decision in Green,114 which the North Carolina
Supreme Court found "dispositive," 115 itself offers little explanation of the con-
stitutional basis for the Barts result. The Green Court, in its one-paragraph dis-
position of the case, simply declared that the relevance of the hearsay to a
"critical issue" and the adoption of the hearsay by the State in an earlier trial
formed "unique circumstances" that mandated admission of the out-of-court
statement.1 16 These "unique circumstances" were present in Barts, but the ex-
clusion of the hearsay by the trial court in Green rested on a rule of evidence that
wholly disallowed admission of statements against penal interest.1 17 This abso-
lute exclusion, against a background in which the overwhelming majority of
states admitted such statements, no doubt influenced the Supreme Court's deci-
sion that Green was denied a fair trial. 118 Unlike Green and Chambers-in
which defendants faced an absolute bar to introduction of mitigating evidence-
109. Thompson v. State, 309 So.2d 533, 535 (Miss.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975).
110. State v. DeFreitas, 179 Conn. 431, 443, 426 A.2d 799, 805 (1980).
111. 295 N.C. 709, 249 S.E.2d 429 (1978).
112. Id. at 726 n.7, 249 S.E.2d at 440 n.7 (quoting State v. Gardner, 13 Wash. App. 194, 198-99,
534 P.2d 140, 142 (1975)). The Haywood court described "the Chambers rule" as requiring the
following: "'(1) the declarant's testimony is otherwise unavailable; (2) the declaration is an admis-
sion of an unlawful act; (3) the declaration is inherently inconsistent with the guilt of the accused;
and (4) there are such corroborating facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the declara-
tion as to clearly indicate that it has a high probability of trustworthiness."' Id.
113. Maness v. Wainwright, 512 F.2d 88, 93 (5th Cir. 1975) (Clark, J., dissenting), cert dis-
missed, 430 U.S. 550 (1977).
114. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam).
115. Barts, 321 N.C. at 181, 362 S.E.2d at 241.
116. Green, 442 U.S. at 97.
117. The Georgia rule was limited to statements against the proprietary or pecuniary interest of
the declarant and further required that the hearsay declarant be deceased. See Little v.
Stynchcombe, 227 Ga. 311, 180 S.E.2d 541 (1971).
118. Green, in his appeal, did not argue for wholesale abolition of restrictions on statements
against penal interest. He only maintained that he should be given the same opportunity to intro-
duce the hearsay as was allowed under the Federal Rules. Petition for Certiorari at 14-15, Green v.
Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (No. 78-5944). Green claimed that, as required by FED. R. EviD.
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it is difficult to discern how the trial judge in Barts, who offered defendant "cler-
ical assistance and time and opportunity to obtain any of those [declarants] to
testify at this sentencing hearing,"' 1 9 could have violated any privilege or immu-
nity "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
fundamental." 120
The Barts court based its decision that due process was violated in part on
the principle that "[e]videntiary rules which normally apply at the guilt phase of
a trial do not necessarily apply with equal force at a sentencing hearing." 12 1 Yet
if the unavailability requirement for statements against interest violates due pro-
cess at the sentencing stage in the Barts situation, it is unclear how that same
requirement could be applied at the guilt phase without the same constitutional
violation. One unusual aspect of Barts is that defendant pleaded guilty to pre-
meditated first degree murder, eliminating the need for the guilt phase of
trial.' 2 2 This allowed the court to evaluate the evidentiary and constitutional
issues only within the context of sentencing. Although the court apparently
sought to limit its holding to "the facts of this case," 12 3 that limitation cannot
logically apply only to sentencing. Had defendant sought to introduce the state-
ment against interest of the available declarant during the guilt phase and had
the trial court followed the rules of evidence and excluded the hearsay, it seems
the factors influencing the Barts majority-that the evidence was highly rele-
vant, trustworthy, and critical to the defense 24 -would require a finding that
the right to fair trial was violated. If a defendant has the fourteenth amendment
right to introduce hearsay to mitigate in favor of a life sentence, it seems that a
persuasive argument can be made that a defendant should have the same right to
introduce the evidence to prove he committed no crime at all.' 25
The absence of a clear rationale for the Barts holding, coupled with what
appears to be a logically suspect attempt to limit its result, leaves the court open
to criticism that the decision was no more than a result-oriented search for any
means of overturning defendant's sentence.1 26 More important, however, the
decision leaves uncertain the status of evidentiary law in all phases of capital
804(a)(1), the hearsay declarant in his case could be proved unavailable because of his invocation of
the privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
119. Barts, 321 N.C. at 179, 362 S.E.2d at 240.
120. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
121. Barts, 321 N.C. at 180, 362 S.E.2d at 240.
122. See id. at 174, 362 S.E.2d at 237-38.
123. Id. at 182, 362 S.E.2d at 241.
124. Id.
125. The Supreme Court, however, has apparently not accepted such logic. Traditionally crimi-
nal defendants have been afforded less procedural protection during the sentencing phases of a prose-
cution. See, eg., N.C. R. EviD. 1101(b)(3) (exempting sentencing hearings from rules of evidence).
Beginning in 1976, however, the Supreme Court, out of concern for the "qualitative" differences
between the death penalty and other forms of punishment, began to increase its scrutiny of death
penalty sentencing. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). These decisions, along with Locket v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 589 (1978),
have essentially reversed the traditional constitutional emphasis, so that a capital defendant now
receives more protection during sentencing than at trial.
126. One can argue, however, that the Bars court was merely following constitutional prece-
dent, that the "result-oriented" decision making in this area had already been performed by the
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trials. Among the rights the due process clause offers criminal defendants are
two types of general protection: protection against an overly rigid legal sys-
tem12 7 and protection against arbitrary and unpredictable trial procedures. 128
The court attempted to ensure this first protection, but it may have done so at
the expense of the latter. The Barts majority apparently believed that, although
defendant was offered "clerical assistance, and time and opportunity" to comply
with the rules of evidence,1 29 he was subjected to an unconstitutionally rigid
proceeding. Such enforcement of standard evidentiary doctrine, even if "unfair"
in the eyes of the court, nevertheless allows defendants to predict with reason-
able certainty the evidence that the triers of fact will receive. 130 In evaluating
Barts as an evidentiary precedent, it is unclear whether members of the bench
and bar will read the case as a broad indication that capital defendants may
introduce all reliable evidence-possibly at all stages of trial-or whether the
decision will be limited as merely an ad hoe judicial aberration. Until the deci-
sion is refined, defense counsel-who rely on knowledge of the admissibility of
evidence at later stages of trial in developing strategy and plea bargains--can
only speculate on how Barts will be construed. Had the Barts court desired to
offer a limited holding, one that could offer predictable guidance to courts and
practitioners, it could have focused on the narrower problem of the State's con-
tradictory actions with respect to Lockemy's testimony. The court could have
arrived at an identical result under traditional evidentiary principles without
touching upon ambiguous notions of due process.
Courts have long recognized out-of-court admissions of a party-opponent
as nonhearsay.131 Unlike hearsay by persons not involved in the dispute, out-of-
court statements by the opposing parties are thought to be insulated from
problems of reliability and fabrication by the adversary system itself.132 Conse-
quently the common law and the codified rules have liberally admitted state-
United States Supreme Court in Chambers and Green. See supra notes 77-97 and accompanying
text.
127. See Chambers, 410 U.S. 284, 302 ("the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to
defeat the ends ofjustice").
128. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
129. Barts, 321 N.C. at 179, 362 S.E.2d at 240.
130. Consider Justice O'Connor's observation in a recent jury-instruction case:
This case squarely presents the tension that has long existed between the two central prin-
ciples of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In Gregg v. Georgia, we concluded that
"where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination
of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably di-
rected and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." In
capital sentencing, therefore, discretion must be "'controlled by clear and objective stan-
dards so as to produce nondiscriminatory application."' On the other hand, this Court
has also held that a sentencing body must be able to consider any relevant mitigating evi-
dence regarding the defendant's character or background, and the circumstances of the
particular offense.
California v. Brown, 107 S. CL 837, 841 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
131. See generally Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE LJ. 355,
357 n.9 (1921) (surveying early case law favoring admissions).
132. For a discussion of the theoretical basis of party admissions, see Hetland, Admissions in the
Uniform Rules: Are They Necessary?, 46 IowA L. Rxv. 307, 308-10 (1961).
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ments of parties, so long as the statements are relevant and competent.133 This
rule of evidence also recognizes that an out-of-court statement by a third person
is a statement of a party when the party accepts the statement as its own. Such
an "adoptive admission" is received into evidence without regard to hearsay
considerations, provided it is offered against the party that has "manifested an
adoption or belief in its truth."'134
The use of adoptive admissions against parties to civil actions is quite com-
mon. Prosecutors often attempt to introduce adoptive statements against de-
fendants in criminal trials as well. 135 The use of such admissions by a defendant
against the State, although rare, is not unknown. For example, in United States
v. Morgan,136 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that when the government indicates by using statements of a police inform-
ant as the basis for procuring a search warrant that it believes the statements are
true, the statements may be offered by a defendant against the State.137 In Mor-
gan, police secured a warrant authorizing the search of a single family dwelling.
The warrant was based upon an affidavit that one "Timmy" was selling drugs at
that location. During the subsequent narcotics trial of William Morgan, who
was arrested at the house, the defense sought to introduce the affidavit as evi-
dence that the government believed "Timmy" and not defendant was guilty of
the crime. The court held that once the government indicates it believes particu-
lar statements are trustworthy, "it may not sustain an objection to the subse-
quent introduction of those statements on grounds that they are hearsay.' 138
The Morgan situation is nearly identical, from an evidentiary point of view,
133. See N.C. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
134. Id. North Carolina Rule of Evidence 801(d) corresponds to Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2). North Carolina did not adopt Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1), which considers prior
statements of a witness as nonhearsay in certain circumstances. This rule would have been of no
assistance to defendant in Barts, because Federal Rule 801(d)(1) requires that the hearsay declarant
testify as a witness and be subject to cross-examination at the present trial. The live testimony of
Keith Barts was precisely what the Bars defendant sought to avoid. See supra notes 102-04 and
accompanying text.
135. E.g., United States v. Kilbourne, 559 F.2d 1263 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 873 (1977);
United States v. Flecha, 539 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1976).
136. 581 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
137. Id. at 938.
138. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has taken an opposing view to that of the District
of Columbia Circuit in connection with adoptive admissions against the State in criminal trial. In
State v. Therriault, 485 A.2d 986 (Me. 1984), the court held that a police laboratory report was not
admissible in a rape trial as an admission of a party opponent because "it is inappropriate to consider
a government agent's statement as a party-opponent admission in the context of a criminal prosecu-
tion .... " Id. at 992. The court reviewed Morgan with approval, but attempted to distinguish the
case as follows:
Similar reasoning arguably could be applied to the facts of the instant case to hold the
laboratory report admissible. The assistant district attorney's acquiescence in stipulating to
the admissibility of the report at defendant's first trial could be seen as an admission by the
State that the report is a reliable statement of its own for the purpose of applying M.R.
Evid. 801(d)(2)(B). We believe, however, that the assistant district attorney's stipulation
more reasonably must be viewed as the adoption of a particular trial tactic. To hold other-
wise under the facts of this case would be to bind the State to a specific trial strategy and to
interfere unreasonably in the State's presentation of the case on retrial. The Morgan excep-
tion, therefore, is not applicable to the present case.
Id. at 993 n.9 (emphasis added).
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to that in Barts. In the earlier trial of Keith Barts, the State introduced Lock-
emy's testimony that Keith had confessed to the beating in order to prove that
Keith alone committed the murder.139 In doing so, the State clearly indicated
its belief in the trustworthiness of the statement. Yet in Barts, the State sought
to exclude the statement as hearsay. Such contradiction by the State was no
doubt due to the lack of clear-cut evidence of who actually administered the
fatal beating. The State, rather than prosecute the cousins for simply being pres-
ent and involved in a robbery that resulted in a murder, sought the death penalty
for each of them individually as the sole perpetrators of the murder. It is this
action rather than the unavailability requirement for statements against interest
that violates the personal immunities "so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." 140 This narrower analysis would
have corrected the unfairness at work in Barts without touching upon the broad
and often confusing concepts of due process and the right to a fair trial.
The majority's disposition of Barts may have been justified given the State's
contradictory actions, but it has obscured an area of law that, although possibly
in need of reform, offered assurances of predictability. The court should refine
the analysis in Barts, either by instituting specific reforms in the unavailability
requirement1 41 or, at the very least, by setting forth the boundaries of eviden-
tiary flexibility to be expected in capital sentencing.142
Unlike adversaries at trial, the supreme court bears the responsibility not
only of protecting justice for a party in a particular case, but also of providing
guidance in order that the law will be clearer and more refined. The Barts
court's facile reliance on ambiguous constitutional authority appears to achieve
139. State v. Barts, 316 N.C. 666, 673, 343 S.E.2d 828, 834 (1986) (appeal of Keith Barts).
140. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. The posturing of the parties in Barts would have
allowed the court to investigate alternatives for its decision. During the sentencing hearing, the State
did not offer a specific ground for its objection to the introduction of the hearsay, and during argu-
ments on the motion, neither the trial judge nor defense counsel referred to the statement-against-
interest exception or to the unavailability requirement. See Brief for Appellant, Appendix C, at 16-
22, Barts, 321 N.C. 170, 362 S.E.2d 235 (1987) (No. 370A84). The supreme court, under principles
of plain error, could have focused on the State's adoption of the hearsay in the earlier trial. See N.C.
R. EvItm. 103(d).
141. See supra note 105.
142. The Barts dissent also provides little guidance. Like the majority, Justice Meyer offered no
analysis of the requirement of declarant unavailability. His only reservation about the majority's
result was the fear that the hearsay might be admitted solely in the form of Lockemy's written
statement. Barts, 321 N.C. at 186, 362 S.E.2d at 244 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Any problems sur-
rounding the validity of the written statement, however, may be cured by procedures within the rules
themselves. Introduction of a document containing hearsay raises the issue of "hearsay within hear-
say." Multiple hearsay is admissible if each hearsay statement-the writing itself and the second-
hand declarations it may contain-are separately admissible. See N.C. R. EvID. 805. A writing is
admissible to prove its contents under authentication principles and the "best evidence rule" if the
proponent proves the document is genuine and unaltered. See N.C. R. EVID. 901, 902, 1001-08.
Justice Meyer also stated that "[s]o l ng as the witness who gives the written statement contain-
ing the hearsay is subject to cross-examination, the interests of justice are properly served." Barts,
321 N.C. at 186, 362 S.E.2d at 244 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Traditional evidence principles, however,
suggest that the risks of hearsay testimony lie not in examination of the hearsay witness, but in the
ability to cross-examine the hearsay declarant. See Wheaton, What is Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REv.
210, 219-22 (1961). Nevertheless, in this regard Justice Meyer is in accord with the majority, who
considered the ability to cross-examine Lockemy as a determining factor in its decision. See Barts,
321 N.C. at 181, 362 S.E.2d at 241.
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the former goal at the expense of the latter. Like Chambers and Green, Barts
purports to be limited to "the facts of this case," 143 but just as the Barts majority
apparently disregarded such language in Chambers and Green, it is equally likely
that Barts will not be restricted to exact duplications of its particular facts.144
Only if courts confine the decision to the characteristic of Barts that is most
distinctive-the attempt by the State to claim evidence as reliable in one instance
and to attack the admissibility of that same evidence in another-will continued
predictability in capital sentencing proceedings be ensured. Defense counsel
look to predictable standards of evidence at the punishment phase in order to
develop trial and plea strategy in the early stages of a case. The unceitain
breadth of the Barts holding may cause defendants to plea bargain and make
tactical decisions based on incorrect assumptions about the admissibility of evi-
dence during sentencing. By simply declaring the right of due process violated
without setting forth how the rules of evidence are in the future to be relaxed,
the Barts majority has replaced procedural rigidity with procedural ambiguity.
In doing so, the court leaves conjecture as the only tool with which courts, pros-
ecutors, and defendants can evaluate the status of evidentiary rules in the "seri-
ous and individualized process of life or death sentencing." 14 5
MARK ANDREW STAFFORD
143. Id. at 182, 362 S.E.2d at 241; see also Green, 442 U.S. at 97 ("Regardless of whether the
proffered testimony comes within Georgia's hearsay rule, under the facts of this case its exclusion
constituted a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Chambers, 410
U.S. at 302-03 ("under the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of the trial court deprived
Chambers of a fair trial").
144. The decision in Bans could be broadened beyond statements against interest. The Green
decision, which the Bans court found "dispositive," Barts, 321 N.C. at 181, 362 S.E.2d at 241, has
been interpreted as applying "to all local rules of evidence and not just the hearsay rule." Hertz and
Weisberg, supra note 88, at 365-66. Green's greatest potential, it is maintained, lies in expanding the
rules of relevancy:
The Green decision... demonstrates that local relevancy requirements cannot be applied
rigidly to exclude mitigating evidence. In considering whether a piece of evidence offered
in mitigation of a death sentence is relevant, the courts should weigh the potentially miti-
gating influence of the evidence against the harm that could result from the violation of the
relevancy rule, and should resolve all doubts in favor of admitting the evidence.
Id. at 366 (citation omitted).
Similarly, defense counsel in Bans believes that the Bans decision stands for the ability of a
defendant to introduce any reliable evidence that is critical to the defense. Consequently, he main-
tains, the accused in a multi-defendant trial should successfully be able to introduce as mitigating
evidence statements made by prosecutors in closing argument of a co-defendant's trial, something
usually disallowed on relevance grounds. Telephone interview with Robert E. Collins, Attorney.At-
Law, Alamance County, North Carolina (Feb. 10, 1988).
145. See Bans, 321 N.C. at 180, 362 S.E.2d at 240.
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